As mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity continues to be very high, the popularity of hostile takeovers and proxy contests for corporate control of public companies is also increasing. The market is seeing new influential figures like activist investors, among others, becoming more and more emboldened to initiate hostile competitions for control. As a result, the U.S. takeover landscape is currently experiencing significant change in its market trends and the legal and regulatory framework surrounding hostile takeovers and proxy contests. This practice note seeks to outline such developments and trends by explaining what hostile takeovers and proxy contests are and how they are conducted, the current legal and regulatory environment surrounding hostile takeovers and proxy contests, and market trends that practitioners in the current takeover landscape should be aware of.

### Notable Transactions

Some of the most notable recent transactions are discussed below.

- **MNG’s attempted takeover of Gannett.** In January 2019, MNG Enterprises Inc. (MNG) privately offered to acquire Gannett Co. Inc. (Gannett) for $1.37 billion. After privately engaging in discussions, Gannett’s board rejected the proposal. In response, MNG nominated a majority slate of directors for election to the board of Gannett. At Gannett’s 2019 annual meeting of shareholders held on May 16, 2019, the shareholders elected all eight of Gannett’s director nominees, effectively rejecting MNG’s takeover proposal. Proxy advisory firms ISS and Glass Lewis, who normally are reluctant to support director slates of hostile bidders in the absence of an extraordinarily attractive offer price, did not recommend voting for MNG’s nominees. In particular, they expressed concerns about MNG’s ability to secure financing for the acquisition citing MNG’s decision to obtain a “highly confident” letter (i.e., a letter where bankers state that they are highly confident that the required financing can be raised) rather than a commitment letter from a bank.

- **Merck’s successful takeover bid for Versum.** While Versum Materials Inc. (Versum) was in the process of implementing an all-stock merger with Entegris Inc. (Entegris), in February 2019, Merck KGaA (Merck) approached Versum with a proposal for an all-cash acquisition, which the board of Versum rejected. In March 2019, Merck launched a tender offer for
Versum's stock and in parallel solicited proxies to vote against the all-stock merger of Versum and Entegris. Subsequently, Merck increased its bid from $48 per share to $53 per share, which prompted the board of Versum to recognize such improved offer as a superior proposal as compared to the transaction with Entegris. On April 12, 2019, Versum terminated the merger agreement with Entegris and entered into a merger agreement with Merck, which the shareholders of Versum approved on June 17, 2019.

- **Barrick Gold’s attempted takeover of Newmont Mining.** Following years of unsuccessful negotiations about combining gold mining operations in Nevada, on February 25, 2019, Barrick Gold Corp. (Barrick) announced an unsolicited proposal to acquire Newmont Mining Corp. (Newmont) in an all-share no-premium transaction. In response, Newmont proposed a joint venture for the Nevada operations. On March 10, 2019, Barrick and Newmont agreed to form the joint venture, which Barrick would operate and hold the 61.5% majority. Accordingly, Barrick discontinued its $17.8 billion takeover bid for Newmont.

- **Bow Street’s overture for the assets of Mack-Cali.** On February 25, 2019, Mack-Cali Realty Corporation (Mack-Cali) received an unsolicited proposal from Bow Street Special Opportunities Fund XV, LP (Bow Street) to acquire for cash Mack-Cali’s suburban and waterfront office assets in a complex transaction in which the remaining residential assets of Mack-Cali would be spun-off to Mack-Cali stockholders. Bow Street held approximately 4.5% of Mack-Cali’s stock. The board of Mack-Cali rejected the proposal, and Bow Street nominated a slate of candidates to Mack-Cali’s board. After settlement negotiations between Mack-Cali and Bow Street fell through and the proxy advisors recommended voting for the nominees of Bow Street, on June 12, 2019, Mack-Cali announced that it withdrew the nominations of its four incumbent directors resulting in the election of Bow Street’s nominees to the board. Mack-Cali also announced that it intends to form a committee to review strategic alternatives, as well as dismantle certain takeover defenses, namely, opt out of Maryland’s anti-takeover statute and rescind the agreement that lets the Mack family nominate up to three directors to the Mack-Cali board.

- **Rice brothers’ contest for control of EQT.** EQT Corporation (EQT) acquired Rice Energy Inc. in November 2017. In December 2018, Toby Rice and Derek Rice, who held approximately 3.1% of EQT’s stock, expressed their dissatisfaction with EQT’s operational performance and proposed to implement a transformation plan at EQT, as well as to reconstitute the EQT board and appoint Toby Rice as the EQT CEO. After some engagement with the Rice brothers, in January 2019, EQT announced various plans and actions to maximize shareholder value. On March 21, 2019, the Rice brothers nominated a majority slate of nine candidates for election at the EQT 2019 annual meeting. The shareholders meeting is scheduled for July 10, 2019, and as of the time of this writing the results of this proxy contest remain to be seen.

- **Broadcom’s attempted takeover of Qualcomm.** On November 6, 2017, Singapore-based Broadcom Limited (Broadcom) submitted an unsolicited proposal to acquire U.S. chip maker Qualcomm Incorporated (Qualcomm) for a combination of cash and stock initially valued at roughly $117 billion, which was rejected by Qualcomm’s board. Broadcom eventually notified Qualcomm of its intention to nominate 11 independent directors to replace Qualcomm’s entire existing board at Qualcomm’s upcoming annual meeting scheduled to occur on March 6, 2018. In response, Qualcomm’s board encouraged shareholders to reject Broadcom’s nominee slate. Two days prior to Qualcomm’s scheduled annual meeting, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) ordered that Qualcomm’s stockholder meeting be delayed for 30 days. On March 12, 2018, U.S. President Trump, after reviewing CFIUS’s recommendation encouraging the enjoinder of the transaction, issued an order blocking the takeover. His order stated there was credible evidence that Broadcom might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States. Notably, on June 8, 2018, a proposed securities class action suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California against Qualcomm and certain other defendants alleging that defendants made materially false and misleading statements and failed to disclose to investors that Qualcomm had secretly filed a unilateral notice with CFIUS in order to frustrate Broadcom’s attempt to acquire the company (Camp v. Qualcomm Inc. et al.). Furthermore, on March 8, 2018, a proposed class action suit was filed in the Chancery Court of Delaware against Qualcomm and certain other defendants alleging that by inviting CFIUS to review the deal the directors of Qualcomm violated their fiduciary duties (Evans v. Qualcomm Inc.). Subsequently, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

- **Carl Icahn and Darwin Deason’s replacement of Xerox’s management.** On January 22, 2018, activist investors Carl Icahn (Icahn) and Darwin Deason...
(Deason), together owning roughly 15% of Xerox Corporation’s (Xerox) common stock, announced they would jointly attempt to elect four directors at an upcoming annual meeting of Xerox. Following such announcement, on January 31, 2018, Xerox and Fujifilm Holdings Corporation (Fujifilm) publicly announced an agreement whereby Fujifilm would acquire Xerox for roughly $6.1 billion with Xerox shareholders receiving a special cash dividend of $2.5 billion. On February 13, 2018, Deason filed suit against Fujifilm and Xerox seeking to prevent the transaction on the basis that it was a result of a crown jewel lockup right created by previously entered into joint venture agreements between Fujifilm and Xerox. Among other things, Deason alleged that such agreements gave Fujifilm control over certain of Xerox’s intellectual property and manufacturing rights in the Asia-Pacific market if Xerox sold a 30% stake to another potential acquirer. Deason later also indicated an intent to nominate a full slate of directors to Xerox’s board. Xerox responded by taking the position that Deason’s proposed directors cannot be nominated unless done in compliance with the advance notice provisions in Xerox’s bylaws. As a result, Deason filed a second lawsuit in New York courts on March 2, 2018, seeking to enjoin Xerox from enforcing such advance notice provisions on the basis that the proposed transaction constituted a change in circumstances that was announced after Xerox’s advance notice provisions’ nomination deadline.

Adopting the Delaware Court of Chancery’s view in Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters. Inc., the New York State Supreme Court declined to enforce Xerox’s advance notice provisions and granted a preliminary injunction of the change of control transaction between Xerox and Fujifilm. Shortly thereafter, Xerox, Icahn, and Deason entered into a settlement agreement requiring the resignation of Xerox’s CEO and the replacement of several Xerox board members. Xerox has since unilaterally terminated its transaction with Fujifilm. As a consequence, Fujifilm has filed suit against Xerox seeking $1 billion in damages, and on February 22, 2019, a federal judge rejected Xerox’s request to dismiss the suit. Interestingly, on October 16, 2018, the decision of the New York State Supreme Court granting the preliminary injunctions was reversed.

Deal Structure and Process

General Background

A hostile takeover is a purchaser’s acquisition of a public company against the wishes of such public company’s incumbent board of directors. Generally, purchasers in this context are referred to as hostile acquirers or hostile bidders. Hostile acquirers may include, among others, competitors of the target company.

Hostile takeovers continue to constitute a significant portion of the current M&A market. In 2017, hostile takeovers reportedly accounted for $575 billion worth of acquisition bids, or about 15% of 2017’s total M&A volume. Despite this, hostile takeovers are rarely the preferred means towards acquiring a target company. Among other things, a failed hostile takeover may:

- Taint the dealmaking track record of the hostile bidder or allow the target company to be acquired by a competitor (e.g., in the case of a white knight scenario as discussed further below)
- Encourage the target company to engage in a public campaign against the hostile bidder that may create doubt with respect to such hostile bidder’s accounting practices, growth prospects, or the sustainability of such bidder’s business if a hostile bidder offers its own shares as consideration
- Result in significant transaction expenses in the form of advisor and/or regulatory compliance fees and carry increased risk as hostile acquirers navigate applicable legal, regulatory, and other pitfalls—or—
- Require hostile acquirers to purchase the target company’s shares at substantial premium prices in order to convince shareholders to tender shares contrary to board recommendations

This all makes hostile takeovers difficult to successfully consummate. With respect to proxy fights specifically, of the reported fights that went to a shareholder vote in 2017, the target company’s management emerged victorious in 53% of cases (as compared to 69% in 2016 and 55% in 2015). Hence, market trends indicate that when it comes to a vote, the shareholders’ support for activists is far from certain. Nevertheless, you or your client may still choose to pursue a hostile takeover for a variety of reasons, including:

- Strategic considerations, such as significant synergies between the target company and the bidder that outweigh the increased risks and costs of proceeding with the hostile takeover
- The bidder’s belief that the target company’s board of directors and upper management are not delivering sufficient shareholder value and that shareholders of the target company may be susceptible to a hostile offer—or—
In an activist shareholder scenario, an acquirer’s general desire to replace the target company’s board of directors and upper management is often driven by the lack of decisive influence, a bidder in a hostile takeover would more readily vote in favor of them. Nevertheless, given their firms view short slates as less disruptive and, therefore, may the sale of the company. Passive investors and proxy advisory takeover defenses or engage in a negotiated transaction for to, among other things, disable poison pills and other anti-the dissident (or hostile bidder) typically obtains the ability the nominees form the majority or the entire board, and directors. With respect to a majority or full slate, if elected, (or minority) slate, control (or majority) slate, or full slate of directors. With respect to a majority or full slate, if elected, the nominees form the majority or the entire board, and the dissident (or hostile bidder) typically obtains the ability to, among other things, disable poison pills and other anti-takeover defenses or engage in a negotiated transaction for the sale of the company. Passive investors and proxy advisory firms view short slates as less disruptive and, therefore, may more readily vote in favor of them. Nevertheless, given their lack of decisive influence, a bidder in a hostile takeover would usually choose to advance a majority or full slate, while short slates are more common in shareholder activism situations.

Proxy Contests and Tender Offers as Forms of a Hostile Offer
Hostile takeovers in the United States usually involve a proxy contest that seeks to replace the board of a target company. This also may involve a hostile acquirer conducting a tender offer to purchase a target company’s shares in order to increase such acquirer’s voting power to replace such target company’s directors during a proxy contest. If the proxy contest is successful, the (now) friendly board of the target company would engage in a negotiated transaction with the bidder. Such negotiated transaction may take the form of another tender offer followed by a merger without a shareholder vote, a long-form merger with a shareholder vote, or other various M&A structures. For further information on tender offers, see Tender Offers Distinctive Characteristics and Market Trends 2016/17: Tender and Exchange Offers. For more information on Proxy Contests, see Election Proxy Contest Preparation.

How Proxy Contests Work
A proxy contest, also referred to as a proxy fight or a proxy battle, is a contest for votes of a target company’s shareholders (also known as proxies) in order to win a shareholder vote on a certain matter. In a proxy contest, a shareholder or a group of shareholders of a company typically solicit proxies in opposition to the recommendation of a target company’s board. In a hostile takeover scenario, a hostile bidder engages in a proxy contest and attempts to persuade the target company’s shareholders to elect new directors (normally, the bidder’s nominees) who are friendly to the takeover. A credible threat of a successful proxy contest alone may force the incumbent directors of a target company to engage in negotiations with a hostile bidder.

In a proxy contest, a dissident shareholder or a group of shareholders nominates a competing slate of director candidates for election and solicits votes in support of such nominees. The dissident shareholder may nominate a short (or minority) slate, control (or majority) slate, or full slate of directors. With respect to a majority or full slate, if elected, the nominees form the majority or the entire board, and the dissident (or hostile bidder) typically obtains the ability to, among other things, disable poison pills and other anti-takeover defenses or engage in a negotiated transaction for the sale of the company. Passive investors and proxy advisory firms view short slates as less disruptive and, therefore, may more readily vote in favor of them. Nevertheless, given their lack of decisive influence, a bidder in a hostile takeover would usually choose to advance a majority or full slate, while short slates are more common in shareholder activism situations.

Regulatory Environment for Proxy Contests and Disclosure Trends
Proxy Rules
Proxy contests are regulated by federal and state laws as well as stock exchange rules. Generally, shareholders cast their votes at annual or special meetings of shareholders. Since most shareholders do not physically attend the meetings, they are permitted to vote through proxies.

Proxy solicitations and dissemination of solicitation materials to shareholders are subject to regulation by Section 14 of and Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act). Proxy rules define solicitation of proxies very broadly to include “communication[s] [...] reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy” (Rule 14a-1(l)(1)(iii)). Subject to limited exceptions, the solicitation of proxies is generally allowed when the solicited party is concurrently furnished or has previously been furnished with a proxy statement filed with and approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Certain types of solicitation communications other than proxy statements are nevertheless allowed prior to the furnishing of the proxy statement and without preapproval by the SEC. Such materials must be filed with the SEC on the same date as their dissemination and must comply with certain other requirements (such communications may include press releases, social media posts, other publications, letters, and emails).

To solicit proxies in favor of its competing directors, the dissident shareholder must file its preliminary proxy statement and proxy card with the SEC at least 10 days prior to the date when the definitive proxy statement and proxy card are first distributed to other shareholders. In a contested election, the target company would also go through the process of filing a preliminary proxy statement and proxy card. After the SEC completes its review of the preliminary proxy statement and the proxy card of both the company and the dissident shareholder, the definitive proxy statement and proxy card may be filed with the SEC and distributed to shareholders.

Among other things, the definitive proxy statement should generally discuss the items to be voted on, voting procedures, and director and officer information. The definitive proxy statement and proxy card generally do not include an in-depth discussion of the hostile acquirer’s actual campaign platform. Rather, the core arguments and theme statements of any given issue presented are typically discussed in so-
called fight letters, which are letters disseminated after the definitive proxy statement and proxy card are reviewed by the SEC. Fight letters constitute additional definitive materials and, although they need to be filed with the SEC upon their first use, are not subject to preapproval by the SEC. To make fight letters more persuasive, dissident shareholders often include or discuss qualitative and quantitative historical performance data, statistical information in relation to past performance shortfalls, any perceived flaws in board composition or process, failed transactions, executive compensation in relation to the corporation’s performance, any related party transactions, any corporate governance weaknesses, and other red flag issues associated with the target company’s performance or nominees.

In the takeover bid scenario, a fight letter may also include a discussion of how the sale of the company is superior to other strategic alternatives available to the shareholders of the target company. If there is no alternative takeover bid, the campaigning hostile bidder or dissident shareholder may also describe its plans for improving the financial results and increasing the share value of the target company as a result of replacing the board. If a proxy advisory firm supports the slate of directors advanced by the hostile bidder or dissident shareholder, the fight letter would typically include a statement that the authoritative proxy advisory firm recommends replacing the board with the competing slate of candidates. While fight letters are intended to sway shareholders and are often less formal than proxy statements, dissident shareholders and hostile bidders should be mindful of the antifraud provisions of the proxy rules. Specifically, fight letters and similar communications may not overstate, understate, or provide misleading information.

Voting Standards in Director Elections

State corporate laws and corporate charters determine the vote needed to elect directors, such as plurality (and its variations) or majority voting. Traditionally, the plurality vote standard results in the election of those directors who receive the most votes. Over the last decade, however, the majority voting standard has received widespread acceptance. It contemplates that the directors who obtain a majority of the votes of the shareholders are elected, and if any incumbent directors do not receive a majority of the votes, such incumbent directors hold over in their positions even if other nominees, who failed to receive majority support, received more votes than such incumbent directors. For this reason, the majority voting standard was intended for use in uncontested director elections, and the corporate charters of most corporations using such standard provide an exception requiring the use of the plurality standard in contested elections. However, by 2015, 13.9% of companies using the majority voting standard did not maintain a contested election exception in their charters. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an influential proxy advisory firm, characterized such design as a potential entrenchment device.

The SEC has recently become concerned with the accuracy of disclosures of election standards in proxy statements, with SEC staff identifying the following ambiguities and inaccuracies in the disclosures of voting standards: the failure to include an against option on the form of proxy when a majority voting standard is used, the mistaken use of the against option on a form of proxy when there was a plurality voting standard and where the only appropriate alternative for voting was withhold, and incorrect statements that withhold votes are counted in determining election outcomes. Boards and dissident shareholders should be mindful of these issues when preparing proxy statements and proxy cards.

How Tender Offers Work

Prior to, during, or independently of a proxy contest, a hostile acquirer may conduct a hostile tender offer by purchasing a target company’s shares from other shareholders against the wishes of such target company’s board. A hostile acquirer may do this by launching, directly to such target company’s shareholders, a bid to purchase a sufficient number of such target company’s shares as needed to replace its board of directors. Upon successfully purchasing such shares, the hostile acquirer may use the voting power of such shares to replace all or a portion of the target company’s directors, as needed, opposing the takeover with friendly directors who will vote in favor of accepting the (previously hostile) bid.

Regulatory Environment for Tender Offers

During a tender offer, a bidder should be mindful of various regulatory requirements. Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act, for example, generally require investors to file a Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G, as applicable, with the SEC within 10 days after acquiring more than 5% beneficial ownership of a voting class of a target company’s registered equity securities. Among other things, it discloses the investor’s identity, purpose for investment, source of consideration, and other material information for the public.

Once a hostile bidder commences a tender offer for more than 5% beneficial ownership of a class of a registered equity security, Regulation 14D of the Exchange Act imposes filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements. A bidder must send the SEC, the target company, and any competing bidders a Schedule TO as soon as practicable on the date of the commencement of the tender offer. A Schedule TO
Casual contact. Acquiring a company without support of its board of directors is difficult. Normally, a potential acquirer would probe the incumbent board’s willingness to engage in a negotiated transaction by having its officers or directors casually discuss the possibility of the transaction with an officer or director of the target company.

Bear hug letters. A hostile acquirer may submit a private bear hug letter to the target company’s CEO and/or board of directors. Such letter would state the hostile acquirer’s desire to acquire the target company and request a friendly negotiation. It often also includes an explicit threat to proceed with a hostile takeover if the board or upper management refuses to negotiate. If the target company refuses, the (now) hostile acquirer may publicly file the bear hug letter to formally alert the target company and its shareholders of the hostile acquirer’s desire to acquire the target at a certain price (e.g., on May 21, 2019, Crane Co. (Crane), an industrial products manufacturer, publicly announced that CIRCOR International, Inc., its competitor, had rejected the $896 million acquisition offer that Crane privately submitted earlier).

Launching a proxy contest or tender offer without bear hug letter. In an extreme situation where the bidder concludes that engagement with the target board would be futile, it may opt to start the process by first launching a proxy contest or tender offer. Proxy contests may be initiated in preparation for a special or annual meeting of the target company’s shareholders or, if the target company’s charter allows, through action by written consent. Tender offers may be initiated by complying with the regulatory requirements set forth in the Exchange Act, as already discussed above.

Topping bids. In some cases, a potential acquirer (friendly or hostile) may have already launched a tender offer to purchase a target company. A hostile acquirer may then attempt to submit a topping bid, or a competing bid to the target company’s board and/or shareholders to purchase the target company (usually for more consideration). While topping bids remain an active means towards pursuing a hostile takeover in the current market landscape, they often increase the costs of acquiring the target company. Among other reasons, this can be due to a hostile bidder agreeing to, if successful, incur a target company’s termination fee that becomes due under the target company’s previously agreed-upon transaction agreement. Usually though, it is because topping bids increase the risk of bidding wars between potential acquirers (e.g., a bidding war unraveled when The Walt Disney Company and Comcast Corp. competed for the assets of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. in the second half of 2018). In 2018, for example, the authors advised the defense contractor General Dynamics Corporation (General Dynamics), which entered into a merger agreement with the government IT service provider CSRA Inc. (CSRA) to purchase CSRA in a $6.8 billion all-cash tender offer. During the tender offer, CACI International Inc. (CACI) submitted to the board of directors of CSRA and made public a $7.2 billion cash-and-stock topping bid to purchase CSRA. In response to the competing bid, General Dynamics engaged in a public campaign to fend off CACI. General Dynamics eventually raised its tender offer price from $40.75 to $41.25 in order to secure a sufficient number of shares to successfully complete the acquisition. In all, the deal totaled roughly $9.7 billion.

In April 2019, the proposed acquisition of Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (Anadarko) by Chevron Corp. (Chevron) became an example of a transaction where the interloper making a topping bid prevailed. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Occidental), after securing a $10 billion investment from Berkshire Hathaway Inc., made a $38 billion superior proposal to acquire Anadarko,
which topped the $33 billion price under the agreement between Anadarko and Chevron. Accordingly, Anadarko terminated its agreement with Chevron and entered into a merger agreement with Occidental.

**Takeover Defenses and Delaware's Standards of Review for Board Actions**

Boards generally are allowed wide latitude to employ takeover defenses to fend off hostile bids. These include:

- **Shareholders’ rights plans or poison pills.** Commonly known as poison pills, shareholders’ rights plans typically allow all shareholders of a target company (except a hostile acquirer) to purchase additional shares of such target company at a significantly discounted rate upon a triggering event. Such triggering event usually takes the form of any shareholder accumulating a certain percentage of the target company’s outstanding shares without the target board’s cooperation. This results in the acquisition of the target company becoming prohibitively expensive for the bidder. Recent market data shows that the number of active poison pills has significantly dropped. This is largely due to shareholder resistance against poison pills in the current market unless they are instituted subject to shareholder approval. On this and similar bases, many companies have allowed their poison pills to expire or have had them affirmatively terminated. At one point, at least 3,000 companies reportedly had a poison pill in place, including 60% of companies constituting the S&P 500. As of 2018, that number has dwindled to over 300 U.S. companies, including roughly 3% of the S&P 500. These statistics may nevertheless be deceiving given a poison pill, if needed, can be adopted by a board overnight. Companies today may even leave their poison pills on the shelf, having already been drafted and approved by the target company’s board and ready to be deployed in little time. Recently, companies have been using poison pills with lower trigger caps to fend off activist hedge funds (see Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, et al., C.A. No. 9469-VCP (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014), where the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the use of a poison pill that would be triggered by a bidder accumulating as little as 10% of the target company’s shares). For further information, see Shareholder Rights Plans and Poison Pills: Fiduciary, Filing, and Disclosure Obligations.

- **Staggered boards.** Staggered board defenses are provisions in a target company’s charter that only allow certain seats on a target company’s board of directors to go up for election in any given year. This prevents a hostile acquirer from being able to replace a majority of a target company’s board in any single year or at any single annual shareholder’s meeting. In the landmark case resulting from the failed takeover attempt of Airgas, Inc. by Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., a combination of a staggered board and a poison pill proved to be one of the most effective takeover defense strategies, the legality of which was validated by the Delaware Court of Chancery (see Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (2011 Del. Ch.)). Investors, however, tend to disfavor staggered boards in the current market because of their potential to entrench boards. In this vein, shareholders continue submitting proposals requesting companies to repeal staggered board provisions. Since 2005, at S&P 500 companies, such proposals have passed 85.5% of the time and only roughly 11% of the companies constituting the S&P 500 had such provisions in place by the end of 2016.

- **State anti-takeover statutes.** State anti-takeover statutes are statutes adopted by various states that seek to protect target companies against unwanted corporate takeovers. Target companies usually have the ability to opt out of or not opt in to such statutes in their charters and most do. In the current market, state anti-takeover statutes continue to remain a relevant takeover defense. In 2016, for example, The Andersons Inc., an Ohio corporation, publicly emphasized that it would not adopt a poison pill in the face of a takeover attempt by HC2 Holdings, Inc. Instead, it relied on its state of incorporation’s anti-takeover statutes.

The state of Delaware’s anti-takeover statute restricts a business combination by a target company and an interested shareholder except in certain situations (see DGCL § 203). One exception, for example, if the target company’s board and the holders of two-thirds (66 2/3%) of such company’s voting stock (excluding the interested shareholder) approve the business combination. Delaware corporations may opt out of DGCL § 203 by expressly stating so in their certificates of incorporation or any subsequent amendments to their certificates of incorporation or bylaws.

- **Advance notice provisions.** Advance notice provisions in a target company’s bylaws require shareholders to provide advance notice to the target company’s board of directors with respect to certain items that such shareholder seeks to discuss at an upcoming shareholder’s meeting. These items typically include board nominations. This notice requirement serves to inform a target company’s board of any impending board nominations and provides the board with more time to prepare and counter such proposals.
Reporting hostile bids to regulators. Some companies targeted by a hostile bidder have tried to oppose the takeover attempts by hindering the hostile bidder’s chances of obtaining regulatory clearances for the acquisition, especially the antitrust clearances (e.g., the board of Qualcomm allegedly tipped off CFIUS to security concerns trying to fend off Broadcom). However, as discussed above, such a strategy may backfire, as such actions of the target’s directors may violate their fiduciary duties. Once the regulatory scrutiny is invited, sale of the company becomes difficult to implement even when the bidder raises the bid price and the board of the target wants to proceed with the takeover.

Alternative offers from white knights and the use of white squires. If possible, a board of a target company may attempt fending off a hostile acquirer by soliciting a bid from a board-preferred friendly acquirer. Such friendly acquirer is often referred to as a white knight. Once a board solicits a competing bid to purchase the target company, it must comply with its Revlon duties (as discussed below) and ensure that the accepted bid provides the greatest immediate value to its shareholders. While difficult to successfully consummate, the use of white knights still occurs in the current market landscape. In September of 2018, for example, the authors advised Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd., a Chinese gold and base metals producer, as it served as a white knight to successfully complete a friendly takeover of Nevsun Resources Ltd. (Nevsun). The competitive deal was valued at roughly $1.41 billion, and arose off the heels of various hostile bids from Nevsun’s rival Lundin Mining Corp., whose offers, according to Nevsun’s board, undervalued Nevsun and its assets.

As an alternative to a full acquisition, a board may encourage an existing friendly shareholder to purchase a noncontrolling block of voting shares in the target company (usually up to 19.9% of the target company’s shares to avoid shareholder vote requirements under the rules of certain securities exchanges). Such shareholder, known as a white squire, would then use its shares to vote in favor of board decisions. Alternatively, a number of friendly shareholders may enter into a voting agreement with the company committing to support the board. For example, after Origin House, a cannabis company, received unsolicited offers from several unnamed suitors, in January 2019, its shareholders representing approximately 26% of the stock entered into voluntary voting support agreements with the company.

Upon shareholder challenge, Delaware courts will generally apply the business judgment rule when evaluating whether a corporate board has violated its fiduciary duties by taking any specific action. The business judgment rule creates a presumption in favor of the board’s action and may generally only be rebutted if the challenging shareholder can show that the challenged actions of the directors were not made (1) in good faith, (2) with reasonably prudent care, or (3) with a belief to be in the best interests of the corporation.

Delaware courts will nevertheless exercise enhanced scrutiny when reviewing whether a target company’s board of directors has complied with its fiduciary duties when adopting takeover defenses. The relevant standards of review were originally set forth in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The more deferential Unocal standard is primarily used to assess a board’s employment of takeover defenses when the board intends to preserve the stand-alone identity of the company. Under the Unocal standard, a board will be viewed to have complied with its fiduciary duties if it can show that the actions of its directors (and the implemented takeover defenses) were (1) made in good faith after reasonable investigation in concluding there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness and (2) reasonable in relation to the threat posed. However, once a board decides to sell a company (e.g., to a white knight) or otherwise agrees to a change of control, the heightened Revlon standard of review applies.

Under Revlon, Delaware courts will require (1) boards to focus on delivering the highest short-term financial value to shareholders rather than the board’s perceived long-term value of the proposed offer to the company and (2) upon a challenge of a board’s decisions by shareholders, that the board’s choices be reviewed with a heightened scrutiny standard that exceeds the business judgment rule. Specifically, the disinterested and independent board must prove that its decision-making process was (1) performed with adequate care and (2) reasonable under the circumstances.

Strategies in Soliciting Support of Different Investor Groups

During a hostile takeover, you or your client may employ various techniques to engage investor groups in target companies. Knowledge of shareholder bases becomes pivotal in such situations. Typically, such investor groups include the following:

- **Activist investors.** Activist investors are individuals or groups obtaining large amounts of a company’s
Passive investors have relationships with large index funds and better investors (who often constitute hostile bidders) may deal’s synergies and the value-creating potential of to exercise a pragmatic approach by evaluating each opposing parties in a hostile deal. They therefore tend most public companies, they are frequently invested in shares. Because large index funds own 5%–20% of historically taken a passive approach to voting such amounts of shares in public companies, but have BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, own massive. Major index fund providers, such as Insights: Shareholder Activism in M&A (2014).

Proxy advisory firms. Although not shareholders themselves, proxy advisory firms such as Glass Lewis and ISS possess significant influence over the results of a proxy contest by making voting recommendations to their subscribers (in particular, various investment advisers who continue relying on the recommendations of the proxy advisors to avoid liability under Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940). Roughly a decade ago, the investment community expressed concern that proxy advisory firms would become super-governance institutions positioned to have the final say in virtually all hostile transaction scenarios. Such fears did not materialize. Although proxy advisory firms continue having a significant influence on hostile transactions, their support is not dispositive of outcomes. While large index funds take recommendations of proxy advisors into account when deciding how to vote, such funds are increasingly relying on their own internal evaluations.

Other investor groups. Other investor groups influential to the outcome of a hostile takeover may include transaction-friendly arbitrageurs who purchase a target company’s shares prior to a transaction with an expectation of making a profit post-transaction; legacy shareholders (e.g., a target company’s founding family) who tend to favor the target company’s historical management; and executive officers, in addition to other management and employees of the target company, who may hold significant amounts of shares through executive compensation or pension plans.

Legal and Regulatory Trends

Several recent developments in the legal and regulatory environment surrounding hostile takeovers may have far reaching consequences for the strategies and tactics that you or your client may employ. These include:

Proxy plumbing initiatives. In November of 2017, the Chairman of the SEC expressed that the SEC may address the cumbersome proxy process for retail investors by revisiting the proxy plumbing concept. Since then the SEC conducted a series of events where market participants could present their views on upgrading the infrastructure supporting the proxy voting system. As a part of the proxy plumbing concept initially released in 2010, the SEC sought comments from the public on various issues relating to the efficiency and integrity of the proxy voting process, including over-voting and

Passive investors. Major index fund providers, such as BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, own massive amounts of shares in public companies, but have historically taken a passive approach to voting such shares. Because large index funds own 5%–20% of most public companies, they are frequently invested in opposing parties in a hostile deal. They therefore tend to exercise a pragmatic approach by evaluating each deal’s synergies and the value-creating potential of the proposed transactions. On the other hand, activist investors (who often constitute hostile bidders) may have relationships with large index funds and be better positioned than an incumbent target company board to obtain support.

Other investor groups. Other investor groups influential to the outcome of a hostile takeover may include transaction-friendly arbitrageurs who purchase a target company’s shares prior to a transaction with an expectation of making a profit post-transaction; legacy shareholders (e.g., a target company’s founding family) who tend to favor the target company’s historical management; and executive officers, in addition to other management and employees of the target company, who may hold significant amounts of shares through executive compensation or pension plans.

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under-voting by broker dealers on behalf of their clients, vote confirmation mechanisms to let participants of the voting process verify whether and how their votes were cast, securities lending issues, empty voting issues, facilitation of direct communication between the companies and beneficial owners, strategies to increase retail investor participation in voting, and the role of proxy advisory firms. This initiative, if adopted, may result in changes that would affect the strategies, tactics, and economics of proxy contests.

• **CFIUS’s role in hostile takeovers.** As mentioned above, on March 12, 2018, following the recommendation of CFIUS, the U.S. president issued an executive order blocking the $117 billion takeover bid of Qualcomm, a U.S. chipmaker, by Broadcom, a Singapore-based company, for reasons of national security. This was reportedly the first time that CFIUS caused a transaction to be enjoined in such a manner.

The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), signed into law on August 13, 2018, expands the jurisdiction of CFIUS to review four additional types of covered transactions:

1. Purchases, leases, or concessions by or to a foreign person of real estate located in proximity to sensitive government facilities

2. Other investments in certain U.S. businesses that afford a foreign person access to material nonpublic technical information in the possession of such business, membership on its board of directors, or other decision-making rights (other than through voting shares)

3. Changes in a foreign investor’s rights resulting in foreign control of a U.S. business or other investment in certain U.S. businesses –and–

4. Any transaction, transfer agreement, or arrangement designed to circumvent CFIUS jurisdiction

FIRRMA also, among other things, provides for a light filing process that could result in shorter CFIUS review time lines, allows CFIUS to collect filing fees, provides CFIUS with some discretion to require parties to file with CFIUS before closing a transaction, and lengthens CFIUS’s review period from 30 to 45 days and allows an investigation to be extended for an additional 15 days in extraordinary circumstances. FIRRMA’s most significant provisions will be effective on the sooner of 18 months following August 13, 2018 (i.e., February 13, 2020) or 30 days after the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury publishes a determination that the necessary resources have been put in place in order for FIRRMA to administer such provisions.

• **Specific enforcement of settlement agreements with activists.** In Sarissa Capital Domestic Fund LP, et al. v. Innoviva, Inc., insurgent shareholder Sarissa Capital Domestic Fund LP (Sarissa) sought to put two of its nominees on the board of Innoviva, Inc. (Innoviva). Because Innoviva initially expected to lose the proxy contest, its board agreed to a settlement proposal during a phone call between the parties although such agreement was not later memorialized. After such events, Innoviva learned it had enough votes to win the proxy contest and elected its nominees to its board in violation of the agreed oral settlement. Sarissa sued for specific performance of the oral settlement agreement. On December 8, 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted Sarissa’s request for specific performance and declared the oral settlement agreement binding and enforceable, notwithstanding the fact that Innoviva actually won the proxy contest. Notably, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that no sum of money damages would fully compensate Sarissa for its loss of the opportunity to secure representation on Innoviva’s board. Given the vast majority of successful activist campaigns end in settlement, the Sarissa decision provides important guidance on the eligibility of such settlement agreements for specific performance.

• **Standard of review for board actions during a proxy contest.** On March 9, 2017, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a restraining order to activist investor venBio Select Advisor LLC blocking Immunomedics Inc. (Immunomedics) from closing a licensing transaction with respect to its drug. If closed, the licensing transaction would effectively have constituted a sale of Immunomedics’s crown jewel product and as such may have been viewed as an entrenchment device. The announcement of the licensing transaction coincided with Immunomedics’s incumbent board learning that dissident board nominees were polling ahead in director elections. In its decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery effectively applied an enhanced scrutiny standard rather than the business judgment rule when reviewing the board’s actions despite there being no immediate change of control.
Market Outlook

As aggressive M&A activity continues in the current market, practitioners looking forward through 2019 and to 2020 can expect additional increases in the amount of hostile takeovers and proxy contests occurring. The successes of recent hostile bids, can be expected to continue driving the U.S. hostile takeover and proxy contest market in the months and even years to come. Nevertheless, cross-border hostile takeovers of U.S. public companies may see a decline as an increasingly protectionist U.S. political landscape, evidenced by new laws like FIRRMA and increased regulatory review by CFIUS, creates additional uncertainty to closing for foreign hostile acquirers.

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Martin C. Glass is co-chair of the firm's Cross-Border Transactions Practice. He counsels US and foreign companies in a wide array of transactional matters.

For over 20 years, Mr. Glass has focused on complex M&A and securities transactions. Domestic and foreign companies and their boards seek his assistance with structuring and negotiating public and private mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, public securities offerings, proxy contests, and other highly complex corporate transactions. Mr. Glass also regularly counsels clients on continuous reporting and corporate governance requirements under the US securities laws and the rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ.

In 2018, he was named as a BTI “Client Service All-Star” based on the survey of general counsels of the Fortune 1000, an award that identifies attorneys that are “not just great— but head and shoulders above the rest as defined solely by clients.” For several years running, Mr. Glass has been mentioned in Euromoney’s IFLR1000 listing of the world’s leading lawyers and recommended in The Legal 500 United States. He is a member of the Committee on Mergers, Acquisitions and Proxy Contests of the New York City Bar Association.

Mr. Glass has experience in a variety of industries, including, life sciences, mining, energy and financial services.

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Before joining Jenner & Block, Mr. Polonyk practiced law at a top-tier law firm in Ukraine. He represented clients in M&A transactions, IPOs, Eurobond issuances, as well as debt restructurings. He has substantial experience advising clients in the banking, IT, energy, and agriculture sectors. IFLR (Energy and Infrastructure 2016) commended him for his “invaluable can-do attitude.”

Mr. Polonyk is fluent in Russian and Ukrainian.

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