Jenner & Block

Consumer Law Round-Up

November 26, 2019 OCC and FDIC Propose “Madden Fix” Rules to Codify “Valid-When-Made” Principle

By: William S. C. Goldstein

New-Development-IconThe long-running saga of Madden v. Midland Funding is entering a new phase.  Last week, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed rules that would codify the concept that the validity of the interest rate on national and state-chartered bank loans is not affected by the subsequent “sale, assignment, or other transfer of the loan.” See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Assigned, or Otherwise Transferred, 84 Fed. Reg. 64229, (proposed Nov. 18, 2019); FDIC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Interest Rate Authority, FDIC (proposed Nov. 19, 2019).  Under these rules, an interest rate that is validly within any usury limit for such a bank when it is made would not become usurious if the loan is later transferred to a non-bank party that could not have charged that rate in the first instance.

The proposed rules are a long-awaited response to the Second Circuit’s decision in Madden, which held that a non-bank purchaser of bank-originated credit card debt was subject to New York State’s usury laws.  786 F.3d 246, 250-51 (2d Cir. 2015).  In so holding, the Second Circuit cast doubt on the scope of National Bank Act (NBA) preemption, which exempts national banks from most state and local regulation, allowing them to “export” their home state interest rates without running afoul of less favorable usury caps in other states (FDIC-insured state banks are afforded similar protections).  Before Madden, it was widely assumed that “a bank’s well-established authority [under the NBA] to assign a loan” included the power to transfer that loan’s interest rate.  See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, 84 Fed. Reg. at 64231. The Madden decision also did not analyze the “valid-when-made” rule, a common law principle providing that a loan that is non-usurious at inception cannot become usurious when it is sold or transferred to a third party. See, e.g., Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833) (“[A] contract, which, in its inception, is unaffected by usury, can never be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transaction.”).  Madden has been widely criticized by a host of commentators, including the Office of the Solicitor General.

The OCC and FDIC rules aim to remedy the confusion caused by Madden.  OCC’s rule “would expressly codify what the OCC and the banking industry have always believed and address recent confusion about the impact of an assignment on the permissible interest.”  Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, 84 Fed. Reg. at 64231-64232.  Likewise, the FDIC rule would rectify “uncertainty about the ongoing validity of interest-rate terms after a State bank sells, assigns, or otherwise transfers a loan.” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 2-3.  Both proposals cite Madden as the source of the confusion.

Notably, neither proposal purports to address the emerging “true lender” doctrine, which some courts have used to apply state usury or consumer protection laws to non-bank entities that have partnered with banks in issuing loans and that retain a “predominant economic interest” in the loan. See, e.g., People ex rel. Spitzer v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 846 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).  Under that doctrine, courts look at whether the bank or the third-party was the “true lender” in the first place, taking loans facing a true lender challenge outside the ambit of Madden and the OCC and FDIC fixes.  In that regard, the OCC proposal notes simply that “[t]he true lender issue . . . is outside the scope of this rulemaking.”  See Permissible Interest on Loans That Are Sold, Fed. Reg. at 64232.  The FDIC proposal likewise notes that the new rules do not address true lender issues, but goes on to express support for the concern animating the true lender doctrine: “the FDIC supports the position that it will view unfavorably entities that partner with a State bank with the sole goal of evading a lower interest rate established under the law of the entity’s licensing State(s).”  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 4.  

Comments are due on the OCC rule by January 21, 2020, and on the FDIC rule shortly thereafter.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

November 11, 2019 Texas Jury Awards $200 Million In Mobile Banking Patent Dispute

By: Benjamin J. Bradford

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On November 6, a jury in the Eastern District of Texas awarded the United Services Automobile Association (USAA) a $200 million verdict finding that Wells Fargo willfully infringed two of USAA’s patents directed to the “auto-capture” process, which is used by banking customers to deposit checks using photographs taken from a mobile phone or other device.  (Civ. No. 2:18-cv-00245 (E.D. Tex.))  Based on the finding of willfulness, USAA may be entitled to enhanced damages beyond the $200 million verdict.

Despite the verdict, the fight between Wells Fargo and USAA is still ongoing.  Wells Fargo filed patent office challenges to the validity of USAA’s patents, which are still pending before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board, but may not be decided for another 15 months.  In addition, Wells Fargo will likely appeal the decision, including a recent denial of summary judgment that found the patents were not invalid under 35 U.S.C. 101.  Nevertheless, the verdict against Wells Fargo will likely embolden USAA to assert its patents against other banks and financial institutions that use an “auto-capture” process. 

CATEGORIES: FinTech

PEOPLE: Benjamin J. Bradford (Ben)

September 11, 2019 DC Court Again Dismisses Challenge to OCC’s FinTech Charter, Splitting with SDNY

By: William S. C. Goldstein

FinTechOn September 3, 2019, a federal district court in the District of Columbia dismissed, for the second time, a lawsuit brought by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) seeking to block the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) from issuing national bank charters to certain non-bank financial technology (FinTech) companies.  Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-cv-2449, slip op. at 1-6 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (CSBS II).  CSBS’s earlier suit, brought in 2017, was previously dismissed by Judge Dabney Friedrich as premature:  Because OCC had not yet finalized its procedure for accepting FinTech charter applications, let alone received any applications, Judge Friedrich found that CSBS’s claims were unripe and alleged no injury sufficient for standing.  CSBS v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 296-301 (D.D.C. 2018).  In October 2018, CSBS brought suit again—this time after OCC had finalized its procedures for accepting FinTech charter applications, albeit before OCC had actually received any applications.  CSBS II, slip op. at 2.  Judge Friedrich held that neither this change nor the Senate’s confirmation of Joseph Otting as Comptroller of the Currency, another change in the facts highlighted by CSBS, “cure[s] the original jurisdictional deficiency.” Id. (alteration in original; citation omitted).  The court pointedly explained that “it will lack jurisdiction over CSBS’s claims at least until a Fintech applies for a charter.” Id. at 5.

In dismissing CSBS’s suit for lack of standing, Judge Friedrich found herself in disagreement with Judge Victor Marrero of the Southern District of New York.  Judge Marrero held in May of this year, on a very similar record, that the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) had standing to challenge OCC’s FinTech plans—and that DFS was right on the merits, essentially blocking OCC from issuing FinTech charters.  See Vullo v. OCC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).  Judge Friedrich “respectfully disagree[d] with Vullo, to the extent that its reasoning conflicts with either this opinion or CSBS I.” CSBS II, slip op. at 2 n.2.  The heart of the divergence seems to be Judge Friedrich’s conclusion that there could be no jurisdiction at least until OCC received a charter application. Id. at 5. Judge Marrero, by contrast, found that OCC “has the clear expectation of issuing [FinTech] charters” and thus that “DFS has demonstrated a ‘substantial risk that harm will occur.’” Vullo, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 288 (citation omitted).  Due to that difference of opinions, CSBS will have to wait at least until a FinTech company applies for a charter before filing again.  Such an application may not be forthcoming, as the SDNY’s ruling may keep any FinTech companies from applying for a charter in the near future, given the legal uncertainty.  The parties in Vullo are in the process of negotiating the language of a proposed final judgment to submit to the court, presumably to allow for OCC to take an appeal to the Second Circuit. See Endorsed Letter, Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18-cv-8377 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2019), ECF No. 38.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

PEOPLE: William S. C. Goldstein (Billy)

August 19, 2019 Regulators Continue to Focus on the Use of Alternative Data

By: Michael W. Ross

In an article published last month in Law360 (and reprinted in our Consumer Finance Observer periodical), our lawyers highlighted the increasing focus of government enforcement Consumer Law Blog - August 2019authorities on how companies are using “alternative data” in making consumer credit decisions. For example, the article highlighted that – as stated in a June 2019 fair lending report from the CFPB – “[t]he use of alternative data and modeling techniques may expand access to credit or lower credit cost and, at the same time, present fair lending risks.” Regulators have continued to focus on this area, including on the benefits and risks of using alternative data in lending decisions.

Earlier this month, the CFPB posted a widely reported-on blog entry on the benefits of using alternative data in lending decisions. The CFPB blog post provided an update to the public on the agency’s first and only no-action letter, issued to Upstart Network, Inc. in 2017. In that letter, the CFPB stated it had no intention of taking action against Upstart under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), which prohibits discrimination in lending, for using certain alternative data sources – particularly information about a borrower’s education and employment history – to make credit decisions. To obtain that letter, Upstart committed to implementing a risk management and compliance plan that included a process for analyzing the potential risk that its use of alternative data could lead to impermissible discrimination against protected classes of consumers.

The CFPB’s blog post reported on the results of Upstart analyzing almost two years of data from its risk management process. Its data showed that Upstart’s model approved 27 percent more applicants than would have been approved by a traditional underwriting model (i.e., one that did not use alternative data and machine learning), and led to 16 percent lower average APRs for approved loans. The CFPB also reported that expansion of credit occurred “across all tested race, ethnicity, and sex segments,” and resulted in particular increases in approval among applicants under twenty-five, those with incomes under $50,000, and those with “near prime” credit scores.[1] These results hearken back to a report by the Philadelphia Federal Reserve in 2017 concluding that the use of alternative data in credit decisions (in that case, relying on data from another FinTech lender, Lending Club) expanded access to credit in underserved areas at a lower cost than would otherwise be available.

The news of Upstart’s results was widely reported, as the use of alternative data in consumer lending remains a hot topic that regulators and legislators are continuing to watch closely.

 

[1] Government agencies and legislators also continue to focus on the potential risks of alternative data. In June, for example, Senators Warren and Jones wrote a letter to various government regulators highlighting concerns that using algorithms in underwriting decisions could lead to unlawful discrimination.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

PEOPLE: Michael W. Ross

July 29, 2019 Facebook’s Libra Prompts Federal Draft Legislation

By: Jeffrey A. Atteberry

CryptocurrencyIn June, Facebook publicly launched an initiative to develop a cryptocurrency called Libra in partnership with 27 other technology and finance companies including Visa, PayPal and Uber.  According to Facebook, consumers will be able to buy Libra anonymously and then use the currency to buy things online, send money to people, or cash out at physical exchange points such as grocery stores.  The blockchain technology behind Libra is meant to be open-source and not controlled exclusively by Facebook, but by an association of its founding companies, each of which has already invested at least $10 million into the venture. 

Facebook’s announcement triggered a rapid response from federal legislators, and on July 15 the House Financial Services Committee introduced draft legislation aimed at preventing large tech companies from creating digital currencies such as Libra.  Entitled “Keep Big Tech Out of Finance Act,” the draft legislation would apply only to tech companies with over $25 billion in annual global revenue that primarily operate online marketplaces or social platforms.  Such companies would be prohibited from using blockchain or distributed ledger technology to create or operate “a digital asset that is intended to be widely used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value, or any other similar function.”  The draft legislation would further prohibit such tech companies from being or affiliating with “a financial institution.” 

The draft legislation is just the latest indication that federal legislators and regulators are increasingly focused on the growing linkages between technology, particularly in the form of social media and online marketplaces, and more traditional consumer finance industries.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

PEOPLE: Jeffrey A. Atteberry

May 20, 2019 SDNY Decision Blocks National Bank Charters for FinTech

By William S. C. Goldstein

FintechEarlier this month, a federal district court in New York handed a win to the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) in its long-running, closely watched suit seeking to block the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) from issuing national bank charters to non-bank financial technology (FinTech) companies that don’t receive deposits.  Judge Victor Marrero denied most of OCC’s motion to dismiss and found the agency’s interpretation of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq., to be unpersuasive.  Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-cv-8377, 2019 WL 2057691, at *18 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019).  DFS’s suit has significant stakes for the FinTech industry: under the United States’ dual banking system, nationally chartered banks are regulated primarily by OCC and avoid the application of most state laws and regulations through federal preemption, while financial institutions without national bank charters are generally subject to state oversight—and non-bank institutions are often regulated by multiple states. Id. at *8.  Judge Marrero’s decision casts doubt on whether comprehensive, uniform regulation of FinTech companies can be achieved without congressional action.

The OCC allegedly first began considering whether to accept applications from FinTech companies for special purpose national bank (SPNB) charters in early 2016, pursuant to a 2003 regulation authorizing such charters for entities engaged in “at least one” core banking function: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money. Id. at *2 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i)).  DFS first sued OCC in 2017, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) prohibits charters from issuing to entities that don’t receive deposits and that to issue them would violate the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.  That suit was dismissed without prejudice in December of 2017 on justiciability grounds after Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald found that DFS had not suffered an injury in fact and that its claims were not ripe. Id. at *3.  After OCC announced in July of 2018 that it would begin accepting applications from non-depository FinTech companies for SPNB charters, DFS sued again, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Tenth Amendment, to prevent OCC from issuing any charters and to invalidate the underlying regulation.  OCC moved to dismiss this past February, arguing that DFS lacked standing, its claims weren’t ripe or timely, and that on the merits it failed to state a claim. Id. at *4.  Judge Marrero issued a decision on OCC’s motion on Thursday, May 2.

Judge Marrero first addressed OCC’s justiciability arguments.  He found that DFS had standing based on two distinct alleged harms: i) the loss of “critical financial protections” for the citizens of New York that would result if non-depository financial institutions were no longer subject to DFS regulation; and ii) direct financial harm to DFS due to the loss of assessments levied on institutions it licenses and regulates. Id. at *8.  As to constitutional ripeness, the Court found that OCC “has the clear expectation of issuing SPNB charters,” and thus that “DFS has demonstrated a ‘substantial risk that harm will occur,’” making its claims ripe. Id. at *9 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.15 (2013)).  Judge Marrero also rejected OCC’s argument that, insofar as DFS was challenging the validity of the underlying regulation authorizing SPNB charters—issued in 2003—its claims were untimely. Id. at *10-11.  The Court noted that DFS’s claims “cannot be both unripe and untimely,” and that to hold otherwise would allow agencies to insulate their actions from judicial review by promulgating rules and then waiting out the limitations period before taking any actions under those rules. Id. at *10.  The Court also invoked several administrative law doctrines and decisions allowing review of agency action where an agency claims broad new authority derived from an older regulation. Id. at *10-11.  OCC is free to re-raise its timeliness defense on a more fully developed record. Id. at *11.

On the merits, OCC’s chief argument was that the scope of the phrase “business of banking” in the National Bank Act is ambiguous, and thus that OCC’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at *13.  The Court was not persuaded by this argument, concluding instead that the text, structure, purpose, and history of the statute all supported a conclusion that the NBA “unambiguously requires receiving deposits as an aspect of the business.” Id. at *13-16.  The original version of the NBA “is replete with provisions predicated upon a national bank’s deposit-receiving power,” and was based heavily on New York’s experience with a state banking law, under which deposit-receiving was always a core, unchallenged power of banks. Id. at *15.  The Court emphasized that OCC had never before chartered a non-depository institution in reliance on the “business of banking” clause; rather, the previous two times OCC began issuing national charters to such institutions, it acted in reliance on congressional amendments to the NBA explicitly authorizing it do so. Id.  The Court was reluctant to find a broad new agency power, with the potential to significantly disrupt the banking industry, in 140-year-old statutory language—the “Congress doesn’t hide elephants in mouse holes” canon. Id. at *16.  Judge Marrero acknowledged a significant line of authority finding ambiguous the “outer bounds” of the “business of banking,” but found those cases inapposite to determining what the necessary core activities of banking are, what he called the “threshold requirements” or “inner limits” of banking. Id. at *17.  In light of all these and other “interpretive clues,” the Court concluded that only depository institutions are eligible for national charters under the NBA’s “business of banking” clause, and that OCC cannot issue such charters to non-depository institutions without specific statutory authorization. Id. at *18.  Accordingly, DFS’s arguments that OCC’s plan to charter FinTech companies would violate the National Bank Act stated claims under the APA. Id. at *18.  However, the Court did dismiss DFS’s Tenth Amendment claim.  DFS argued that OCC violated the Tenth Amendment by exceeding its statutory authority and acting contra to congressional intent. Id.  The Tenth Amendment allows litigants to object to exercises of federal authority that exceed “the National Government’s [constitutionally] enumerated powers.” Id. at *19 (citation and quotations omitted).  The authority to regulate national banks has long been recognized as within the scope of the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution’s Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. Id. at *18.  The court observed that DFS did not allege that it would “categorically lie beyond federal authority” for Congress to authorize OCC to issue national bank charters to non-depository institutions. Id. at *19.  DFS therefore did not state a Tenth Amendment claim. Id.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

PEOPLE: William S. C. Goldstein (Billy)

May 20, 2019 SDNY Decision Blocks National Bank Charters for FinTech

By William S. C. Goldstein

FintechEarlier this month, a federal district court in New York handed a win to the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) in its long-running, closely watched suit seeking to block the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) from issuing national bank charters to non-bank financial technology (FinTech) companies that don’t receive deposits.  Judge Victor Marrero denied most of OCC’s motion to dismiss and found the agency’s interpretation of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq., to be unpersuasive.  Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-cv-8377, 2019 WL 2057691, at *18 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019).  DFS’s suit has significant stakes for the FinTech industry: under the United States’ dual banking system, nationally chartered banks are regulated primarily by OCC and avoid the application of most state laws and regulations through federal preemption, while financial institutions without national bank charters are generally subject to state oversight—and non-bank institutions are often regulated by multiple states. Id. at *8.  Judge Marrero’s decision casts doubt on whether comprehensive, uniform regulation of FinTech companies can be achieved without congressional action.

The OCC allegedly first began considering whether to accept applications from FinTech companies for special purpose national bank (SPNB) charters in early 2016, pursuant to a 2003 regulation authorizing such charters for entities engaged in “at least one” core banking function: receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money. Id. at *2 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i)).  DFS first sued OCC in 2017, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) prohibits charters from issuing to entities that don’t receive deposits and that to issue them would violate the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution.  That suit was dismissed without prejudice in December of 2017 on justiciability grounds after Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald found that DFS had not suffered an injury in fact and that its claims were not ripe. Id. at *3.  After OCC announced in July of 2018 that it would begin accepting applications from non-depository FinTech companies for SPNB charters, DFS sued again, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Tenth Amendment, to prevent OCC from issuing any charters and to invalidate the underlying regulation.  OCC moved to dismiss this past February, arguing that DFS lacked standing, its claims weren’t ripe or timely, and that on the merits it failed to state a claim. Id. at *4.  Judge Marrero issued a decision on OCC’s motion on Thursday, May 2.

Judge Marrero first addressed OCC’s justiciability arguments.  He found that DFS had standing based on two distinct alleged harms: i) the loss of “critical financial protections” for the citizens of New York that would result if non-depository financial institutions were no longer subject to DFS regulation; and ii) direct financial harm to DFS due to the loss of assessments levied on institutions it licenses and regulates. Id. at *8.  As to constitutional ripeness, the Court found that OCC “has the clear expectation of issuing SPNB charters,” and thus that “DFS has demonstrated a ‘substantial risk that harm will occur,’” making its claims ripe. Id. at *9 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.15 (2013)).  Judge Marrero also rejected OCC’s argument that, insofar as DFS was challenging the validity of the underlying regulation authorizing SPNB charters—issued in 2003—its claims were untimely. Id. at *10-11.  The Court noted that DFS’s claims “cannot be both unripe and untimely,” and that to hold otherwise would allow agencies to insulate their actions from judicial review by promulgating rules and then waiting out the limitations period before taking any actions under those rules. Id. at *10.  The Court also invoked several administrative law doctrines and decisions allowing review of agency action where an agency claims broad new authority derived from an older regulation. Id. at *10-11.  OCC is free to re-raise its timeliness defense on a more fully developed record. Id. at *11.

On the merits, OCC’s chief argument was that the scope of the phrase “business of banking” in the National Bank Act is ambiguous, and thus that OCC’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at *13.  The Court was not persuaded by this argument, concluding instead that the text, structure, purpose, and history of the statute all supported a conclusion that the NBA “unambiguously requires receiving deposits as an aspect of the business.” Id. at *13-16.  The original version of the NBA “is replete with provisions predicated upon a national bank’s deposit-receiving power,” and was based heavily on New York’s experience with a state banking law, under which deposit-receiving was always a core, unchallenged power of banks. Id. at *15.  The Court emphasized that OCC had never before chartered a non-depository institution in reliance on the “business of banking” clause; rather, the previous two times OCC began issuing national charters to such institutions, it acted in reliance on congressional amendments to the NBA explicitly authorizing it do so. Id.  The Court was reluctant to find a broad new agency power, with the potential to significantly disrupt the banking industry, in 140-year-old statutory language—the “Congress doesn’t hide elephants in mouse holes” canon. Id. at *16.  Judge Marrero acknowledged a significant line of authority finding ambiguous the “outer bounds” of the “business of banking,” but found those cases inapposite to determining what the necessary core activities of banking are, what he called the “threshold requirements” or “inner limits” of banking. Id. at *17.  In light of all these and other “interpretive clues,” the Court concluded that only depository institutions are eligible for national charters under the NBA’s “business of banking” clause, and that OCC cannot issue such charters to non-depository institutions without specific statutory authorization. Id. at *18.  Accordingly, DFS’s arguments that OCC’s plan to charter FinTech companies would violate the National Bank Act stated claims under the APA. Id. at *18.  However, the Court did dismiss DFS’s Tenth Amendment claim.  DFS argued that OCC violated the Tenth Amendment by exceeding its statutory authority and acting contra to congressional intent. Id.  The Tenth Amendment allows litigants to object to exercises of federal authority that exceed “the National Government’s [constitutionally] enumerated powers.” Id. at *19 (citation and quotations omitted).  The authority to regulate national banks has long been recognized as within the scope of the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution’s Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. Id. at *18.  The court observed that DFS did not allege that it would “categorically lie beyond federal authority” for Congress to authorize OCC to issue national bank charters to non-depository institutions. Id. at *19.  DFS therefore did not state a Tenth Amendment claim. Id.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

February 22, 2019 CSBS Releases Recommendations for FinTech Regulators

By Camila A. Connolly

New-Update-IconOn February 12, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) released its Fintech Industry Advisory Panel Recommendations.  CSBS is a national organization of financial regulators from around the United States, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and the US Virgin Islands. The recommendations are designed to improve the use of regulatory technology and harmonize regulatory standards throughout the United States.  The recommendations include a plan to develop a model state law for MSBs and to standardize licensing requirements.  The panel also recommended a pilot program for building a uniform state licensing examination.  Overall, the recommendations seek to create uniformity in state FinTech licensing and regulation.  To aid in the harmonizing process, the panel recommends creating repositories of the different state laws and licensing requirements so that financial companies can access all necessary regulations at once.  CSBS includes these recommendations as part of a broader effort to streamline state FinTech regulation called Vision 2020.  Read the full list of recommendations here.

CATEGORIES: FinTech

PEOPLE: Camila A. Connolly